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 INNOVATION AND REVERSE PAYMENTS 
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Settlements of patent litigation between branded and generic drug makers that include 
a promise by the generic maker to stay out of the market, sometimes in exchange for a 
‘reverse’ payment, increase the profits of drug makers at the expense of consumers. Some 
commentators argue that drug makers will invest these profits in innovation, ultimately 
making consumers better off. Drug market data suggest, however, that the resulting gains 
to consumers may still be insufficient to offset consumer losses from delayed access to ge-
nerics. Even when innovation is taken into account, antitrust can most efficiently eliminate 
the risk of consumer harm from delayed access to generics only by banning all settlements 
that fix a date of generic entry, including all reverse payment settlements. If antitrust seeks 
to maximize consumer welfare, rather than merely to eliminate the risk of consumer harm, 
then antitrust should instead intervene directly in settlement negotiations to defend the 
interests of consumers, because only intervention both preserves the innovation benefits of 
settlement while minimizing the opportunity of drug makers to settle for delayed generic 
entry. In no case, however, should antitrust challenge only settlements involving large re-
verse payments, as other commentators have suggested antitrust should do. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
 For nearly twenty years, antitrust enforcers in the United States 
have tried to stop branded drug makers from suppressing challenges 
to their drug patents by paying the generic drug makers who bring the 
cases to drop them and stay out of the market until the expiration of 
the patent term.1 These kinds of settlements of drug patent litigation, 
which cost consumers about $3.5 billion per year in higher drug 
prices,2 are part of a broader class of agreements in which the branded 
maker (‘Brand’) obtains a commitment to delay entry from a generic 
maker (‘Generic’) that may or may not include a payment, sometimes 
called a reverse payment, from Brand to Generic as inducement. 
 Entry settlements can harm consumers because the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office does not do a good job of reviewing patent ap-
plications, allowing branded drug makers to obtain patents to which 
they are not actually entitled under the law, and which therefore 
would be held invalid by a reviewing court.3 And because, even when 
a patent is valid, a generic drug may not infringe the patent, but a 
branded maker may assert incorrectly that the generic drug does in-
fringe.4 As a result, the real test whether a patent protects a drug is 
the judgment of the court that hears an attempt to assert the patent. 
 By binding a generic maker to stay out of the market, a settlement 
of patent litigation allows a branded drug maker to enjoy protection 
from competition for a longer period than a court might allow. The date 
of entry to which drug makers agree is likely to be later than the date 
a court would choose because a major interest protected by patent law, 
                                                                                                                       
 1. See infra Section II.A; see also C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Anti-
trust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
629, 657-61 (2009) [hereinafter Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach] (recounting the early his-
tory of attempts to regulate these settlements). The courts prohibit settlements that delay 
entry past patent expiry. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and 
the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 4-5, 5 n.10 (2014) [here-
inafter Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements] (describing a rule that would allow 
only delay that does not extend past patent expiry as “consistent with a long tradition” in 
federal law). 
 2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-
commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM3U-RUUB]. 
 3. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1495-97 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (observing that the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office commits insufficient resources to reviewing pa-
tent applications and arguing that this is a good thing because it is better to expend resources 
only on patents that are actually disputed in court). 
 4. See, e.g., Judgment Order, Shire Dev. LLC v. Cadila Healthcare Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-
00581-KAJ (D. Del. Sept. 16, 2016) (rejecting, due to non-infringement, assertion of drug 
patent against generic maker). 
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that of consumers, is not represented at settlement negotiations. Thus 
the interest of consumers in early competition and lower prices is not 
taken into account in the date of entry chosen by the drug makers.  
 The debate over the merits of entry settlements, which has played 
out almost entirely in the context of settlements that include a reverse 
payment, has for the most part ignored the relationship between delay 
and innovation that is the reason for the existence of patent law.5 One 
consequence of that relationship, however, is that the harm to consum-
ers from delaying entry on an invalid patent might be only apparent, 
but not real. The extra delay might generate profits that fund research 
and development that leads to better drugs and an improvement in the 
welfare of consumers in the long run. That welfare improvement may 
compensate for the higher prices associated with delay in the short run.6  
 This Article is the first to take gains from innovation into account 
in determining the proper rule that antitrust should apply to regulate 
entry settlements.7 The foundation for the antitrust analysis of gains 
from innovation in the patent context is the assumption that the date 
of entry that a court would choose using patent law is the date that 
maximizes the welfare of consumers, after balancing the innovation 
benefits of delay against the harm of higher prices. Courts may not 
actually choose the welfare-maximizing date of entry in practice, but 
as a matter of institutional deference, antitrust must assume that the 
courts, following patent law, succeed in this undertaking.8 The job of 
antitrust is to ensure that in colluding via their settlement agreement 
                                                                                                                       
 5. For contributions to this debate that do not account for innovation, see infra notes 
14, 16. For antitrust’s conscious aversion to considering gains from innovation, see Douglas 
H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 21 (2012) (discussing reasons for which antitrust does not normally take 
dynamic efficiency into account); J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in 
Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 586 (2009) (lamenting same). For an intro-
duction to the economic justification for patent, see Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: 
The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 2, Spring 2005, at 57, 58-59. 
 6. For a graphical treatment of the relationship between profits, innovation, and con-
sumer welfare, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 
126-33 (2013) [hereinafter Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust]. 
 7. Langenfeld and Li consider returns to innovation in concluding that a payment from 
Brand to Generic in exchange for Generic’s agreement to stay out of the market during pen-
dency of patent litigation (so-called ‘partial payments’) should not be banned. See James 
Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: 
The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manu-
facturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 805, 810 (2003).  
 8. See infra Section III.C; see also Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent 
Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 295 (2012) (arguing that antitrust should “assume 
that substantive patent law is optimal”). 
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to set their own date of entry, the drug companies do not leave con-
sumers worse off than they would be if the courts had been allowed to 
determine the welfare-maximizing date of entry under patent law.9  
 Under this standard, a ban on all drug patent settlements that limit 
the date on which a generic maker may enter the market, regardless 
whether the settlement includes a reverse payment, is the best rule for 
antitrust to apply to entry settlements.10 A ban on all entry settle-
ments protects consumers against harm by giving the courts the op-
portunity to impose the welfare-maximizing entry date in all cases. 
Although a rule limiting reverse payment size is an attractive alterna-
tive, because it requires only scrutiny of the size of any reverse pay-
ment for enforcement, it allows harm to consumers under certain cir-
cumstances, and must therefore be rejected. The rule that the U.S. Su-
preme Court adopted in FTC v. Actavis, which calls for case-by-case 
review of settlements for consumer harm, does prevent harm to con-
sumers.11 But the rule, which is known as a rule of reason, is more 
expensive to enforce than an entry settlement ban, which requires only 
a determination that a settlement limits entry. The same is true for 
another alternative, a rule of settlement supervision by an adminis-
trative agency, such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’).  
 A rule of reason protects consumers from harm by weeding out all 
those settlements that in fact delay entry relative to the date of entry 
that a court would choose.12 The disadvantage of a rule of reason is 
that it offers no benefits cognizable by antitrust in exchange for the 
greater expense associated with case-by-case review.13 Its proponents 
defend it on the ground that it allows firms to make settlements that 
might benefit consumers while freeing up funds for investment in re-
                                                                                                                       
 9. See infra note 69.  
 10. I reach this conclusion in Section IV.B.9. Whether each of a number of alternative 
rules allows harm to consumers is reported in column ‘Meets uncertainty corollary’ in Table 
1. Elhauge and Krueger also suggest that a ban may be an appropriate rule, although they 
do so without taking gains from innovation into account. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 
8, at 292 (“If direct inquiry into probabilistic patent strength is too unreliable, then the best 
substantive solution would be categorical condemnation . . . .”). 
 11. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (concluding that 
enforcers “must prove [their] case as in other rule-of-reason cases”). 
 12. See infra Section IV.B.6. 
 13. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1460-66 (2009) (discussing the high cost of bringing a case under a rule 
of reason). 
2017]  INNOVATION AND REVERSE PAYMENTS 777 
  
search and development that would otherwise be wasted on litiga-
tion.14 Indeed, it is for this reason that the Court adopted it.15 But, as 
I indicated above, antitrust’s mission is not to improve on the outcome 
that would otherwise be achieved by the courts and patent law, but 
only to prevent drug makers from detracting from it. So the rule costs 
more without offering antitrust any advantage.  
 A rule either banning outright, or limiting the size of, any reverse 
payment that Brand makes to Generic as part of an entry settlement 
eliminates the incentive that a payment creates for Generic to agree 
to greater delay.16 But it does not prevent the parties from making 
settlements that delay entry relative to what a court would order.17 
Whether this rule harms consumers depends on how much delay firms 
will agree to under the rule and the extent to which the investment in 
innovation it makes possible compensates for the higher prices that 
result. This question can be answered only by actually predicting the 
effect on consumer welfare of settlements allowed under the rule. In 
another work, I use a model of innovation and entry settlements to 
make such predictions for the average drug.18 These predictions show 
                                                                                                                       
 14. See Bruce H. Kobayashi et al., Actavis and Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the 
Temporary Duopoly, 29 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2015, at 89, 93-94 (suggesting that full 
blown rule of reason analysis, rather than an abbreviated version that uses the size of a 
reverse payment as a proxy for harm, is the appropriate standard because using payment 
size as a proxy “will not produce settlements that increase consumer welfare net of litigation 
costs”); Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements That Settle Pa-
tent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 662 (2004) (rejecting a rule “condemn[ing] . . . agree-
ments with financial payments” and arguing that “[a]ntitrust policy should encourage settlement 
agreements with dates of entry that are socially advantageous”). 
 15. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (observing that “offsetting or redeeming virtues are 
sometimes present” in a reverse payment settlement). 
 16. This approach has many advocates. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation 
Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. 255, 261-64 (2009) (advocating a reverse payment ban); Aaron Edlin et al., 
Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST, no. 1, Fall 2013, at 16, 21-22 [hereinafter Edlin et al., 
Activating Actavis] (arguing that the Supreme Court’s opinion in FTC v. Actavis should be 
interpreted to make unexplained reverse payments in excess of litigation cost presumptively 
illegal); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regu-
latory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1596 (2006) [hereinafter Hemphill, Paying 
for Delay] (advocating a presumption of illegality for settlements that involve a large reverse 
payment or that allow the generic firm to make use of the 180-day first-filer exclusivity af-
forded it under the Hatch-Waxman Act, but advocating balancing of harms and benefits for 
other entry settlements).  
 17. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 312-23 (arguing that entry settlements 
that involve no reverse payment are often anticompetitive). 
 18. I describe the model and my estimates in Ramsi A. Woodcock, Product Innovation 
in a Model of Settlements of Drug Patent Litigation [hereinafter Woodcock, Product Innova-
tion] (Sept. 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2702474 [https://perma.cc/A2DF-U836]. That article constructs a dynamic model 
based on the standard model of innovation used by economists to determine optimal patent 
length and breadth. See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 
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that even when no reverse payment at all is permitted and innovation 
is taken in account, it is sometimes profitable for drug makers to make 
settlements that harm consumers.  
 Whether drug makers make harmful settlements under a rule lim-
iting reverse payments depends on the sort of competition that pre-
vails if the generic firm is able to enter the market before the expira-
tion of the putative patent term.19 If entry by one generic triggers entry 
by many other generic makers, then these firms will compete price 
down to competitive levels, and the benefit to consumers of early entry 
will be great, making the harm to consumers from delay great as well. 
In this case, my estimates suggest that gains from innovation are too 
meager to compensate consumers for the harm associated with delay, 
even when a reverse payment in any amount is banned. By contrast, 
if only a small number of generics enter before patent expiry, price 
falls only modestly after the firms enter, and consumers are not 
greatly harmed by delay, because their gains from generic entry are 
small. In that case, a ban on reverse payments in excess of Brand’s 
cost of litigating the case through to judgment is sufficient to guaran-
tee that settlement will not harm consumers. 
 I also consider a rule that would install a representative of the con-
sumer interest at the settlement bargaining table.20 The FTC, for ex-
ample, might play that role, intervening in drug patent litigation on 
behalf of consumers and ensuring that any entry date negotiated in 
settlement not harm consumers relative to the outcome that the courts 
would choose. This rule would have an effect similar to a rule of reason, 
ensuring, on a case-by-case basis, that settlements not harm consumers, 
but operating before the settlement is made, rather than afterward. The 
cost of administering the rule would be high because the rule would re-
quire government supervision of every patent settlement.21  
                                                                                                                       
22 ECON. POL’Y 680 (2007) (an example of the standard model). I am not aware of any other 
formal dynamic treatment of drug patent entry settlements.  
Langenfeld and Li’s work does not model the effect of delay on research and innovation 
directly, but instead assumes that delay will increase the number of future innovative drugs 
that will be brought to market, estimates the consumer welfare of new drugs, and then con-
siders the effect of delay on consumer welfare assuming various guesses regarding the num-
ber of new drugs that will reach market as a result of delay. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 7, 
at 800, 802, 804.  
 19. See infra Section IV.B.5. 
 20. See infra Section IV.B.7. 
 21. Elhauge and Krueger also appear to want to bring the consumer interest into the 
patent litigation. They suggest that consumers be given standing to challenge patents that 
become the subject of an entry settlement that does not involve a reverse payment. See El-
hauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 292, 324-25. If consumers would be allowed to use such 
standing to intervene in patent litigation before a settlement is reached, then this proposal 
is equivalent to my own, differing only in that private parties, rather than a government 
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 The problem of drug patent settlements cannot be divorced from the 
question how much profit must be allowed to branded drug makers to 
create the best incentive for investment in research and development, 
because the purpose of the patent laws is to create such an incentive.22 
But this does not mean, as the literature on drug patent settlements 
sometimes suggests, that the additional profits afforded by settle-
ments contribute enough to research and development to justify the 
delay in generic entry and higher prices that may come with them.23 
This Article shows that because, even after taking gains to innovation 
into account, settlements that fix a date of entry cannot always be ex-
pected to preserve consumers from harm, relative to the welfare con-
sumers would enjoy without settlements, a ban on settlements that fix 
a date of entry is an appropriate antitrust rule. 
 This Article builds on my argument in another work that the entry 
settlement debate is focused too narrowly on settlements that involve 
a reverse payment from Brand to Generic.24 Generic drug makers can 
find it profitable to agree to delay entry even in the absence of a reverse 
payment, and even after gains from innovation are taken into account. 
So the proper objects of concern for antitrust are settlements that limit 
the ability of drug makers to enter the market, not just those that in-
clude a large payment.25  
 This Article also builds on that other work by interpreting antitrust 
law to require that settlements pose no risk of harm to consumers, a 
doctrine that I call the ‘uncertainty corollary’ to antitrust’s consumer 
                                                                                                                       
agency, would carry out the supervision of settlements. I differ from Elhauge and Krueger 
in that they suggest that this is the best solution under a standard that measures harm 
relative to welfare under litigation. Because of the costliness of supervision, I view an entry 
settlement ban as the better rule under that standard. I conclude, however, that if the goal 
is to maximize welfare under settlement, then a supervision rule is the best approach. See 
infra Section IV.D.  
 22. For sources that attempt this divorce, see supra note 5. 
 23. See, e.g., Kobayashi et al., supra note 14, at 95 (defining as “the costs of ‘dynamic’ 
Type I errors . . . the costs of forgone innovation due to the reduced incentives that result 
from the erroneous invalidation of patents” and observing that “because patent terms are 
not set optimally, but are based upon the arbitrary statutory rule of 20 years from filing, it is 
possible that a full error cost analysis, taking dynamic Type I errors into account, would find 
that settlement agreements where generic entry is not allowed before the expiration of the 
patent in fact increase dynamic welfare, which would support the scope of the patent test.”). 
 24. Ramsi A. Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, 84 TENN. L. REV. 99, 105 
(2016) [hereinafter Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments]. Elhauge and Krueger 
also argue for greater attention to entry settlements that involve no reverse payment. See 
Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 292 (“Many, including the FTC and DOJ, have assumed 
that settlements with no reverse payments will likely set exclusion periods that equal the 
expected litigation exclusion period. However, we prove that this conventional wisdom is 
untrue.” (footnote omitted)). 
 25. See Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 112-19. 
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‘protection standard’ in patent settlement cases.26 The literature has 
appeared to favor a different rule, which would tolerate a risk of harm-
ful settlement in order to make possible settlements that might benefit 
consumers.27 This alternative rule should be rejected because it would 
substitute antitrust law for patent law as the ultimate decider of the 
right amount of delay to use to stimulate innovation. As I indicated 
above, antitrust’s job is not to try to make consumers better off than 
they would be under the court’s application of patent law. Antitrust 
must therefore seek to eliminate all types of settlements that pose a 
risk of harm.28 
 Outside of the patent settlement context, antitrust quite appropri-
ately uses a different baseline in measuring harm. That baseline is the 
highest welfare that antitrust might possibly use its regulatory powers 
to achieve, rather than the welfare that the courts would achieve in 
the absence of settlement.29 The baseline amounts to the requirement 
that any antitrust rule force firms to choose a settlement entry date 
that maximizes consumer welfare. A settlement ban does not meet this 
requirement because it only maintains consumer welfare at the level 
the courts would achieve in litigation.30 The maximum a court would 
achieve through litigation must fall below welfare under the best set-
tlement because litigation wastes resources that branded drug makers 
could spend on research and development.  
 A rule of reason can do only slightly better than a settlement ban.31 
A rule of reason would continue to use the welfare consumers would 
achieve under litigation as baseline, weeding out only those settle-
ments that reduce welfare relative to that baseline, and therefore al-
lowing suboptimal settlements. Unlike a ban, however, it would allow 
                                                                                                                       
 26. See id. at 129-33. I discuss the uncertainty corollary and the protection standard in 
Section II.C. 
 27. See, e.g., Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 289 (“The problem with categorical 
illegality is that sometimes a positive reverse payment could be consistent with a socially 
desirable settlement.” (emphasis omitted)); Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory 
and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 633 (2015) [hereinafter Edlin et al., The Actavis 
Inference]; Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST, 
no. 2, Spring 2014, at 83, 87; Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the 
Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1067 (2004). 
 28. See Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 129-33. 
 29. See infra Section IV.D. The creator of the litigation welfare baseline sometimes seems 
tempted to abandon it in favor of this maximization standard. See Edlin et al., Activating Ac-
tavis, supra note 16, at 16; Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 609. 
 30. See infra Section IV.D. The column of Table 1 titled ‘Meets maximization standard 
(rank)’ provides a ranking of antitrust rule options under the maximization standard.  
 31. See infra Section IV.D. 
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settlements that make consumers better off relative to litigation, giv-
ing it the potential to achieve better outcomes for consumers and per-
haps to make up for its greater cost. 
 A rule limiting the size of a reverse payment can do even better 
than a rule of reason, depending on the maximum amount of delay it 
allows.32 If the amount allowed is not too great, then it may permit less 
delay than a rule of reason. This would ensure that settlements make 
consumers better off than under litigation, because a rule of reason 
ensures no delay sufficient to harm consumers relative to litigation. 
But in this case, as in the case of a litigation welfare baseline, the effect 
of a rule limiting reverse payment size depends on the amount of com-
petition after generics enter the market. It is possible for the delay 
allowed even by a complete ban on payments to make consumers worse 
off than under a rule of reason or a ban on entry settlements generally. 
 The best choice under a maximization standard is a rule that re-
quires supervision of settlements by the FTC or other regulator.33 Be-
cause supervision allows the consumer interest to be reflected in the 
settlement bargain, it is the option most likely to produce settlements 
that successfully balance the gains from innovation against the harm 
of higher prices and thus to maximize consumer welfare. Accordingly, 
if institutional deference to patent law is rejected, and antitrust is asked 
to maximize consumer welfare, then antitrust enforcers must intervene 
in all drug patent litigation settlements to ensure that the parties nego-
tiate the optimal settlement from the perspective of consumers. 
 I proceed by first providing some background on the regulation of 
drug patent settlements and the economic models employed in evalu-
ating them.34 I then discuss the shortcomings of a model that does not 
take gains from innovation into account and how a model that does 
take them into account explains the prevailing antitrust standard, 
which requires the avoidance of harm to consumers relative to con-
sumer welfare under litigation.35 I then show that a settlement ban is 
the best antitrust rule under a standard that requires the avoidance 
of harm to consumers and that allowing the government to intervene 
in settlement negotiations is the best rule under a standard that re-
quires the maximization of consumer welfare.36 
                                                                                                                       
 32. See infra Section IV.D. 
 33. See infra Section IV.D. 
 34. Part II. 
 35. Part III. 
 36. Part IV. 
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II.   THE REGULATION AND THEORY OF DRUG ENTRY SETTLEMENTS 
A.   Regulation 
 Drug patent litigation is the subject of a regulatory regime designed 
to force a judicial resolution of patent disputes before a generic maker 
enters a drug market.37 The Hatch-Waxman Act38 requires that a 
branded drug maker declare patents covering a drug for which it has 
obtained FDA approval.39 A generic maker wishing to introduce a ge-
neric version of the drug into the market before the expiration of a 
declared patent must state its intention to do so in what is known as 
a Paragraph IV certification, giving Brand the chance to sue to assert 
any patents it believes prevent entry.40 The Act provides that Brand 
may treat this certification as patent infringement, immediately file 
suit, and obtain a stay on introduction of the drug into the market of 
up to 30 months while its claim of infringement is pending in court.41 
Generic may defend by arguing that Brand’s patent is invalid or not 
infringed. By way of incentive to generic makers to challenge patents, 
the Act provides 180 days of exclusivity to the first generic to file a Par-
agraph IV certification for a particular drug if the generic is eventually 
able to enter the market. The Act grants this exclusivity regardless 
whether the first generic enters as a result of winning the litigation, the 
decision of Brand not to sue, or pursuant to a settlement with Brand.42  
 It is not clear when branded and generic makers started agreeing 
to delay entry as part of settlements of these suits, but around the year 
2000 private and public plaintiffs started to challenge settlements be-
tween Brand and Generic pursuant to which Generic would agree to 
stay out of the market for a period of time in return for a payment from 
                                                                                                                       
 37. See Colleen Kelly, Note, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 424 
(2011) (stating that the purpose of the regime was to ensure that “the infringement dispute 
could be resolved before the generic drug hits the market”). 
 38. The official title of the Act is Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585, codified in relevant part, as amended, at 21 
U.S.C. § 355, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
 40. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 41. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see also C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning 
Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 
955 (2011) (“Since 1998, a first-to-file generic drug maker has been eligible for the bounty 
provided that it does not lose the patent suit, even if it never actually wins the patent litiga-
tion. Indeed, it may earn the exclusivity even if it was never sued, so long as it was the first 
to file an ANDA.”). 
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Brand.43 Such payments became known as ‘reverse’ payments because 
through them value flows from plaintiff to defendant instead of from 
defendant to plaintiff, as typically happens when a settling defendant 
acknowledges infringement, agrees to respect the patent going for-
ward, and pays damages for its attempt to enter prematurely. Enforc-
ers alleged that these settlements amounted to blatant market divi-
sion agreements pursuant to which Brand would monopolize the drug 
market and use the payment to give Generic a cut of its illegal profits.44  
 After a period during which the courts refused to intervene out of 
respect for what they took to be the intention of patent law to allow 
Brand to do anything short of inducing Generic to stay out of the mar-
ket past the expiration of the patent term,45 the Court in Actavis held 
that the settlements could be subject to scrutiny under antitrust’s rule 
of reason standard.46 That standard provides that a potentially anti-
competitive practice, such as a reverse payment settlement, may be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and treated as a violation of antitrust 
law only where it can be shown that the practice harms consumers 
under the circumstances of a particular case.47 
B.   The Static Model 
 The mission of antitrust is to prevent harm to consumers, where 
harm has the economic meaning of a reduction in consumer welfare.48 
                                                                                                                       
 43. See Complaint, In re Abbott Labs., 2000 WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000) (No. C-
3945) (early FTC reverse payment administrative complaint); Hemphill, An Aggregate Ap-
proach, supra note 1, at 657, 657 n.112 (stating that the FTC started enforcement actions in 
2000 and that the first private lawsuit of which the author was aware was filed in 1998). 
 44. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 910 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The 
plaintiffs . . . allege that they were deprived of a less expensive generic product, forcing them 
to purchase the higher-priced brand name product, because of a per se illegal horizontal  
market restraint.”). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333-35 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 46. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (“[T]he FTC must 
prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases.”). 
 47. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 38 (2d ed. 2001) (“[A] ‘Rule of  
Reason’ . . . allow[s] a fuller and more flexible inquiry into the economic consequences of a 
challenged agreement . . . .”). 
 48. See Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements, supra note 1, at 7 (observing 
that in FTC v. Actavis “the [Supreme] Court unanimously agreed that ‘consumer welfare’ 
rather than total welfare is the goal of antitrust enforcement”); John B. Kirkwood & Robert 
H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Effi-
ciency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008); Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real 
and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336-38 (2010). For a somewhat more technical discussion of the 
points made in this Section II.B, see Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra 
note 24, at 107-25.  
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Academic debate about the merits of reverse payment settlements has 
been carried out by reference to an economic model that does not in-
corporate gains from innovation into the calculation of consumer wel-
fare. The absence of innovation effects in the model earns it the moni-
ker ‘static’ to contrast it with the dynamic character of a model that 
would incorporate the feedback effect of higher prices on innovation 
and consumer welfare. In this static model, consumer welfare is al-
ways falling as the date of generic entry grows later.49 Before Generic 
enters, Brand charges a monopoly price for the drug, which keeps con-
sumer welfare at a minimum because the high price both denies access 
to the drug to some consumers who cannot afford it and forces those 
who can afford it to pay more. Once Generic enters the market, price 
falls to a duopoly level until the expiration of the patent (the ‘single 
entry case’). If many additional generic firms are able to enter the mar-
ket after the expiration of Generic’s first-filer exclusivity, price falls to 
a competitive level after 180 days of duopoly (the ‘multiple entry 
case’).50 When price falls, consumers pay less for the drug, and their 
welfare increases. Thus the earlier that Generic enters, the shorter the 
low-welfare period of high pricing and the greater the overall welfare 
consumers obtain from the drug before patent expiry. 
 Because delay harms consumers, academic debate regarding re-
verse payment settlements has focused on the problem of determining 
whether the date of entry that firms choose in settlement is later than 
the ‘litigation entry date.’51 This is the date of entry that reflects the 
probability that the patent would hold up in court, also known as its 
‘strength.’52 Thus a patent with a 50% chance of being upheld and eight 
years remaining on its term has a litigation entry date of four years 
(50% times eight years). In this example, the question for antitrust is 
whether a settlement between Brand and Generic would postpone Ge-
neric’s entry by more than four years.53  
                                                                                                                       
 49. See, e.g., Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra note 16, at 22; Willig & Bigelow, 
supra note 14, at 680-81. 
 50. For models of the multiple entry case, including one not treated in this article in 
which multiple generics enter only after settlement, see Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, 
supra note 27, at 621-34. 
 51. See Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, 14 ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, no. 1, Oct. 2014, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs] (“We 
define a settlement in a reverse payment case as anticompetitive if consumers are worse off 
under the settlement than they would be under one of two benchmarks: (1) the outcome of 
litigation, in expectation . . . .”); Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 679 (“[T]he benchmark for 
[evaluating settlements] may necessarily be the expected outcome of the patent litigation.”). 
 52. See Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 664. 
 53. This can also be seen in Figure 1 infra. Consumer welfare, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, is falling. Under 
litigation, consumers are at the level corresponding to the entry date labeled ‘expected entry,’ 
which is the litigation entry date. Because 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is declining, consumers are worse off if entry 
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 Brand prefers delay because it permits Brand to charge a high price 
for a longer period. In the absence of a reverse payment, Generic pre-
fers hastening because it permits earning of its share of duopoly profit 
for a longer period. Antitrust limits the settlements to which Brand 
and Generic may agree to a settlement range.54 When no reverse pay-
ment or payment from Generic to Brand (an ‘obverse payment’) is per-
mitted, the litigation costs of the parties are the key determinant of 
which dates of entry fall within this settlement range. The greater the 
hastening of entry relative to the litigation entry date, the more 
Brand’s litigation cost savings from settlement are eaten up by its 
losses from hastening. The range is bounded on the low end by the date 
of entry that leaves Brand as well off as it would have been paying 
litigation costs and entering at the litigation entry date.55 
 The greater the delay relative to the litigation entry date, the more 
Generic’s litigation cost savings from settlement are eaten up by its 
losses from delay. The settlement range is therefore bounded on the 
high end by the date of entry that leaves Generic as well off as it would 
have been paying litigation costs and entering at the litigation entry 
date.56 Figure 1 shows consumer welfare (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) and the settlement range 
(demarcated by ‘min’ and ‘max’) in the single entry case, and Figure 2 
shows it in the multiple entry case, of which more below. 
                                                                                                                       
in settlement takes place at any date after the litigation entry date, which is to say, if entry 
takes place at any point to the right of the point labeled ‘expected entry.’  
 54. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 664 (“There is . . . a range of mutually 
agreeable potential settlements.”). 
 55. See id. at 665 (“[T]he incumbent, who prefers later entry to earlier entry, would be 
willing to accelerate entry relative to the expected date under litigation if the cost in foregone 
profit were not greater than the saved litigation costs.”). 
 56. See id. at 664-65 (“The entrant, who prefers earlier entry to later, would be willing 
to postpone entry somewhat past the expected date of entry under litigation if the postpone-
ment were not so protracted that the cost to the entrant in lost profits were more than what 
it saved in avoided litigation costs.”). 
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 In single entry, consumers do not pay litigation costs either directly 
or indirectly, and therefore settlement at the litigation entry date has 
no effect on consumer welfare. Only delay can make consumers worse 
off. In multiple entry, litigation actually makes consumers better off, 
all else equal. This is because in litigation there is always the chance 
that Brand will lose, and consumers will obtain the increased value 
associated with competitive pricing after expiration of Generic’s first-
filer exclusivity. By contrast, in settlement, for entry dates that are 
within 180 days of patent expiry, first-filer exclusivity cannot expire 
before the expiration of the patent and so consumers cannot enjoy com-
petitive pricing before the expiration of the patent term.61 Because 
consumers are better off under litigation for any given entry date, 
some hastening in entry under settlement is required in order to leave 
consumers as well off as under litigation.62 In multiple entry, there-
fore, the goal of antitrust is not only to preclude delay, but also to pre-
clude settlements that fail to hasten entry sufficiently to avoid harm 
to consumers. 
                                                                                                                       
 61. Cf. Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 623 (“Under settlement, 
Brand will surely benefit from the partial protection associated with duopoly rather than 
free entry. . . . Under litigation, Brand will only receive this partial protection if it loses the 
patent litigation. . . . Settlement gives an additional value equal to the difference between 
these two . . . .”). 
 62. Consider Figure 2 infra. The top side of the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 triangle represents consumer welfare 
in litigation and the bottom lines give it in settlement. The dashed horizontal line gives the 
amount of hastening in entry required for a settlement to provide value to consumers equal 
to what they would obtain at the litigation entry date (which is labeled ‘expected entry’ in 
the figure). 
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Brand’s litigation cost.64 A payment in excess of litigation cost by 
Brand causes Brand to give up all of its gains from the avoidance of 
litigation cost, plus some additional amount, and Brand therefore 
must insist on settling for delay in order to avoid making a loss.65 The 
litigation cost rule therefore precludes settlements that necessarily in-
volve delay. The rule is effective at banning only settlements that 
harm consumers, but not at banning all settlements that harm con-
sumers.66 It fails, for example, to prevent settlements for delay that 
involve no reverse payment.67  
C.   The Proper Antitrust Standard 
 In the patent settlement context, there are two ways to apply the 
goal of antitrust to prevent consumer harm.68 The first, which is gener-
ally accepted in the literature, is to prevent reductions in consumer wel-
fare relative to the value consumers would obtain in litigation.69 This 
‘protection standard’ is the source of antitrust’s interest in precluding 
settlements that delay entry relative to the litigation entry date in the 
static model.70 The second possible way to apply the goal of harm pre-
vention is to prevent reductions in consumer welfare relative to the 
greatest possible value that consumers might possibly achieve, whether 
in litigation or settlement. This amounts to a rule of consumer welfare 
                                                                                                                       
 64. See, e.g., Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra note 16, at 17 (arguing that the rule 
appears in the Actavis opinion as a presumption); Harris et al., supra note 27, at 87-88 (at-
tacking the rule). 
 65. See Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra note 16, at 17 (“The patentee is willing to 
pay an amount up to litigation costs to get as much protection from competition as it expects 
to get from litigation. . . . Payment beyond this threshold, however, looks suspiciously like pay-
ment to avoid more competition than would be expected from the outcome of the patent case.”). 
 66. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 620 (“The [litigation cost 
rule] will fail to capture some anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements with payments less 
than anticipated litigation costs.”). 
 67. For example, the settlement range shown in Figure 1 supra gives the settlement 
dates to which Brand and Generic can agree in the absence of any reverse or obverse pay-
ment. Because the maximum point in the range is to the right of the litigation entry date 
(marked ‘expected entry’), the range allows some settlements that harm consumers. 
 68. For a more detailed discussion of the points in this Section II.C, see Woodcock, Un-
certainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 127-49. 
 69. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON., no. 2, 
Summer 2003, at 391, 396 (“I propose . . . the following simple antitrust rule: a patent set-
tlement cannot lead to lower expected consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongo-
ing litigation.”); Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 296; Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anti-
competitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1727 
(2003).  
 70. See supra text accompanying note 51. For more on the protection standard, see 
Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 128-29. 
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maximization: antitrust should choose the rule that leads to the great-
est possible consumer welfare.71 I call this the ‘maximization standard.’ 
 In addition to facing a choice between these two rules, antitrust also 
faces a decision about how to cope with uncertainty regarding the set-
tlement entry date that firms will choose. One approach is to deter-
mine the average entry date that the parties will choose in settlement. 
Any rule that fails to preclude all harmful settlements meets the pro-
tection standard only if it may be assumed that firms will choose 
enough beneficial settlements to counteract on average the effects of 
the harmful settlements that may be chosen under the rule. There is, 
however, no consensus on how often firms choose any given settlement 
and therefore no way to calculate this average. 
 In the absence of this information, a dominant strategy is to choose 
a rule that guarantees no harm to consumers.72 I call the requirement 
that a rule allow no settlements that harm consumers the ‘uncertainty 
corollary’ to the protection standard.73 A ban on all settlements that 
fix a date of entry is an example of a rule that meets the uncertainty 
corollary. By forcing the parties to litigate the entry date, a settlement 
ban guarantees that consumers will never suffer harm relative to a 
litigation value baseline.74 A rule of reason also satisfies the uncer-
tainty corollary because it culls all settlements that harm consumers 
relative to litigation value on a case-by-case basis.75 A dominant strat-
egy in the context of the maximization standard is one that ensures 
that in every state of the world consumers do at least as well as under 
every other possible rule. 
III.   FROM STATIC TO DYNAMIC  
A.   Shortcomings of the Static Model 
 The static model is inadequate for antitrust analysis of patent set-
tlements because the model cannot explain why a patent settlement, 
or even the very institution of patent protection itself, might ever ben-
efit consumers. But a dynamic model, which allows for the possibility 
that a branded drug maker will use profits to make a better drug, 
                                                                                                                       
 71. Cf. Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra note 16, at 16 (“A reverse payment also 
amounts to a payment for delay if the parties would have settled for an earlier entry date in 
the but-for world where such large reverse payments were banned.”). 
 72. The strategy is dominant in the sense that it ensures that in each possible state of 
the world there is no harm to consumers. It therefore avoids the problem of uncertainty re-
garding which state of the world will actually obtain. See MARTIN PETERSON, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 41-42 (2009) (explaining dominance). 
 73. See Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 130. 
 74. See id. at 130-31. 
 75. See id. at 135. 
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thereby increasing consumer welfare, can explain why patents and pa-
tent settlements might be good for consumers. When branded drug 
makers spend on innovation, the litigation costs a branded maker 
saves through settlement, or the additional profits a branded maker 
generates by using a patent to delay generic entry, might finance prod-
uct improvements that ultimately help consumers.  
 While it is true that in the static model some settlements, namely 
those that hasten entry, can benefit consumers, this is true only be-
cause in the static model consumers have nothing to gain from any 
amount of delay in generic entry. Consumers do best in the static 
model when there is no patent protection and generic entry is imme-
diate, because the branded drug maker does not invest any profits 
from delay in improving the product.76 When there is no hastening in-
volved, and the settlement entry date is the litigation entry date, con-
sumers gain nothing from settlement in the static model. The branded 
drug maker does save on litigation costs, but in the static model the 
branded drug maker does not reinvest those savings in innovation.  
 It might be thought that in the static model the branded drug 
maker might at least directly pass on any savings on litigation costs 
to consumers by charging lower prices, but even that benefit to con-
sumers is impossible in the static model. Because consumers do not 
themselves pay the litigation costs of drug makers, litigation cost sav-
ings can be passed on to consumers only if drug makers would have 
raised prices to cover those costs to begin with. In the static model, 
however, firms cannot raise prices to cover litigation costs.77 The mo-
nopoly and duopoly prices charged to consumers under litigation or 
settlement before expiration of the patent term represent maximum 
possible prices given the level of competition in the market. If fixed 
costs, such as litigation costs, increase for producers, producers absorb 
those costs entirely, so when those costs are removed, prices remain 
unchanged, and the savings are captured entirely by producers. This 
is the only possible assumption in a monopoly market, as the monopoly 
price generates the greatest possible quasi-profit.78 In a duopoly, it is 
                                                                                                                       
 76. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 680-81 (giving expressions for con-
sumer surplus for which it is always falling in delay); Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra 
note 16, at 22 (implicitly invoking an ever-downward sloping consumer welfare line in stat-
ing that “[w]e consider the settlement anticompetitive if it leads to more monopoly and less 
duopoly, thereby harming consumers, compared to litigation”). 
 77. Because consumer welfare does not change in response to the saving of litigation costs, 
the consumer welfare line in Figure 1 supra gives consumer welfare under both litigation and 
settlement. Otherwise, if settlement were to make consumers better off, the line representing 
consumer welfare in settlement would lie above the line representing it in litigation.  
 78. Quasi-profit is profit before the deduction of any fixed costs, such as the cost of re-
search and development. 
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possible  that increased fixed costs might lead to an increase in prices.79 
It is standard  to assume that this is not the case, and all other treat-
ments of reverse payments make this assumption, at least implicitly.80 
Indeed, even in a competitive market, litigation costs do not affect 
prices because those costs are borne only by the parties to the litiga-
tion. The other generic drug makers in a competitive market do not 
bear those costs and will therefore compete price to a level that does 
not take those costs into account.81 
 Any discussion of the virtues of settlement in the static model 
misses the broader implication of the model, however, which is that 
the entire institution of patent protection can only harm consumers. 
In the static model, patent protection of any kind allows branded drug 
makers to extract value from consumers through delayed generic en-
try without giving consumers anything in exchange, because branded 
makers are assumed in the model not to spend profits on product im-
provement.82 The fact that antitrust scholars have spent decades de-
fending rules that would preserve the right of firms to settle patents 
                                                                                                                       
 79. For example, suppose that duopolists are prone to Bertrand competition but that 
each knows that the other will not charge a price below average cost. And suppose that each 
has identical average cost. Price will equal average cost. As fixed cost, such as litigation cost, 
rises, average cost and therefore the duopoly price will rise as well. 
 80. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 680-81 (stating that “each firms’ in-
stantaneous rate of profit is β under duopoly” and proceeding to use β to model litigation 
and settlement value). Textbooks employ the Cournot duopoly model. See, e.g., DAVID M. 
KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 326-28 (1990). In a classic Cournot 
duopoly, a duopolist chooses her output, taking the output of her competitor as given. Thus, 
given her competitor’s output, a duopolist acts like a monopolist, choosing her own output 
and the market price. This means that the price that a duopolist chooses gives it the greatest 
possible quasi-profit. It cannot increase this price in response to higher fixed costs, such as 
litigation costs, without reducing quasi-profit. Because both duopolists are in this position, 
fixed costs such as litigation costs do not affect the duopoly price.  
 81. In the case of multiple entry, consumers are better off under litigation for any given 
entry date. Settling for entry at the litigation entry date in this case not only does not help 
consumers, it hurts them.  
Concern with preserving the ability of producers to save litigation costs makes sense in 
a static model only under a total, as opposed to a consumer, welfare standard. Total welfare 
takes not only the welfare of consumers into account but also the welfare of producers. Be-
cause drug makers pay litigation costs, these costs reduce producer welfare and therefore 
total welfare, giving antitrust a reason to try to avoid them under a total welfare standard. 
Antitrust has not, however, used this standard. See supra note 48. 
 82. This is reflected in Figure 1 supra. The highest point on the CS line occurs when 
there is immediate entry. Because the line slopes downward, consumers are better off at this 
point than at any other, including at any other level of hastening of entry relative to the 
litigation entry date (marked ‘expected entry’ in the figure). See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 
396 (“Clearly, a short-run consumer surplus standard is not sensible when intellectual prop-
erty rights are involved: declaring all extant intellectual property rights invalid could well 
maximize short-run consumer surplus, but at the obvious expense of longer-term innovation 
and consumer interests.”). Antitrust cannot tolerate this implication because antitrust tends 
to be highly deferential toward patent-related activity. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
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for entry at the litigation entry date, and indeed would respect the 
authority of patent law to delay generic entry, suggests that they are 
implicitly relying on a dynamic model that incorporates gains from 
innovation.83 The static model antitrust scholars prefer to use provides 
no support for their positions.84 
B.   The Relationship Between Innovation and Delay 
 There are many theories about the relationship between innovation 
and competition.85 As suggested in the forgoing Section, the relation-
ship considered in this Article links profit to the quality of the drug 
produced by the branded drug maker. Competitive pressures, or the 
prospect of creating greater demand, impel the branded drug maker to 
invest some of the quasi-profits the branded maker generates from the 
monopoly price the branded maker is able to charge before generic en-
try, as well as any duopoly profit generated after generic entry, in re-
search and development, improving the quality of the drug and there-
fore the value the drug confers on consumers at any given price.86 The 
transformation of delay into profit may happen through expectations 
rather than in real time. Anticipating the ability to charge higher 
prices during the period of delay, the branded drug maker may borrow 
more money to invest in drug development, leading to a more effective 
product when development is complete and the drug has been intro-
duced into the market. Thus delay in entry stimulates innovation and 
benefits consumers.  
                                                                                                                       
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 269 (4th ed. 2011) 
(observing that “[p]atents enjoy a presumption of validity . . . [and] patent settlement agree-
ments are often approved even if they are competitively suspicious.”). 
 83. See supra notes 27, 51 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 656 n.3 (“There may be tradeoffs between 
long-run and short-run consumer welfare due to the effect of preventing settlements on in-
novation and the impact of innovation on consumer and social welfare, which we do not ad-
dress in this article.”). 
 85. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 619-22 ( 1962) (arguing that a firm in a competitive market has a greater incentive to 
innovate than does a monopoly because the competitive firm has more to gain); Jonathan B. 
Baker, Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, and Innovation, 48 
REV. INDUS. ORG., no. 3, May 2016, at 269, 270 (presenting a model in which the effect of 
profit on innovation depends on whether a dominant firm regards the investment of its rival 
in research and development as a strategic complement or substitute). 
 86. For a graphical treatment, see Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 6, 
at 126-33. 
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 Against this positive effect on consumer welfare must be balanced 
the negative effect of higher prices with which the static model is con-
cerned.87 If delay is too great, diminishing returns to research and de-
velopment, and the acceleration in the loss of consumer welfare asso-
ciated with more units of the drug becoming unaffordable to consum-
ers, make consumers as a group end up worse off than they would be 
at lower levels of delay.88  The date of entry that strikes the balance is 
the optimal date of entry: the date that makes consumers as well off 
as they possibly can be.89 This theory forms the basis for the standard 
economic justification for patent protection over a limited term.90 
 The absence of the positive effect of innovation on consumer welfare 
in the static model is reflected in the downward slope of the line in 
Figure 1.91 Incorporating the positive effect bends the line, as reflected 
in Figure 3, because losses to consumers from higher prices are ini-
tially offset by gains from innovation. The result is a consumer welfare 
maximum that lies at an intermediate point between immediate entry 
and delay until patent expiry.92 Because the connection between profit 
and innovation also allows litigation cost savings to help consumers, 
that connection also shifts the entire consumer welfare line up in set-
tlement, from 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙, giving consumers a reason to care whether 
producers save on litigation costs, even if producers are unable to pass 
those costs along to consumers through higher prices. 
                                                                                                                       
 87. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 16, at 1556 (“A substantial literature seeks 
an optimal reconciliation between these competing values by encouraging innovation with-
out sacrificing too much consumer access.”). 
 88. Cf. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 294 (“[T]he economic literature shows that 
patent profits that exceed the optimal level result in excessive investments in innovation 
that reduce social welfare . . . .”). 
 89. Cf. id. at 293-94 (“If designed optimally, the patent system will maximize overall 
consumer welfare by giving patent holders the optimal fraction of ex post total surplus cre-
ated by their innovations.”). 
 90. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 16, at 1556, 1556 n.10 (“The instrumen-
tal case for patent law . . . depends upon high prices as a means to reward and thereby 
encourage innovation, a source of ‘dynamic’ efficiency.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 303-04 (1988) (observing that the view that patent 
law uses personal gain to create an incentive for people to invent “clearly has dominated 
official pronouncements on American . . . patents. Even the Constitution’s . . . patent clause 
is cast in instrumental terms.”). 
 91. See Figure 1 supra. 
 92. See Figure 3 infra. A formal model in which this relationship appears may be found 
in Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 7-16. 
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through to a final judgment, and entry were therefore expected to oc-
cur on the litigation entry date without any saving of litigation costs.93 
 In choosing the protection standard, antitrust defers to patent law 
in answering the question how much delay is required to maximize 
consumer welfare after taking innovation into account.94 Patent law 
may be thought of as using its choice of the rules that judges apply in 
deciding patent challenges to manipulate the litigation entry date for 
any given patent. In measuring harm against that date, antitrust ac-
cepts the role of ensuring that drug makers not use settlements to 
change the optimal date chosen by patent law. Antitrust accepts this 
role of deference because it is the mission of patent law to use delay to 
maximize the welfare of consumers after taking gains from innovation 
into account.95  
 In deferring to patent law, antitrust gives up the opportunity to 
make consumers better off than they could be under litigation. For any 
given litigation entry date, a settlement for entry on the same date 
frees up funds that would otherwise have been spent on litigation for 
investment in research and development instead, and therefore makes 
consumers better off. This is reflected in Figure 3, which shows that 
the settlement consumer welfare maximum is greater than the litiga-
tion consumer welfare maximum.96 That is, Point H is higher than 
Point C.97 A number of commentators do not recognize that consumer 
welfare in settlement may exceed consumer welfare in litigation after 
gains from innovation are taken into account, suggesting incorrectly 
that through maximizing welfare in litigation, patent law maximizes 
welfare over both litigation outcomes and settlement outcomes.98 
                                                                                                                       
 93. I introduced the protection and maximization standards in Section II.C. 
 94. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 295 (“[I]t is best to assume that substantive 
patent law is optimal. Although scholars sometimes argue that current patent law upholds 
too many patents, or too few, some balance must be struck. Even if one believes that current 
patent law does not strike the correct balance, the correct solution is to reform patent law, 
not to allow courts in antitrust cases to second-guess patent law doctrine and try to offset it 
imperfectly . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 95. See Hughes, supra note 90, at 303-04 (observing that the view that patent law uses 
personal gain to create an incentive for people to invent “clearly has dominated official pro-
nouncements on American . . . patents. Even the Constitution’s . . . patent clause is cast in 
instrumental terms.”). 
 96. See Figure 3 supra. 
 97. Point H is not maximum consumer welfare in settlement, as the optimal settlement 
and litigation entry dates differ, but Point H falls at the optimal litigation entry date. See 
Figure 3 supra. 
 98. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 288 (“Further, if we assume (for the purpose 
of antitrust analysis) that patent law has been optimally designed, then the odds of patent 
victory in litigation reflect the extent to which the patent holder should be rewarded with 
supracompetitive profits. Therefore, a settlement also exceeds the optimal patent exclusion 
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 There is a tension between the deference required by the protection 
standard and the inability of patent law to maximize consumer wel-
fare. That tension accounts for antitrust’s quest to ban harmful settle-
ments while still preserving the ability of drug makers to settle in 
ways that increase consumer welfare. Antitrust’s goal appears to be 
to respect the protection standard while still leaving open the possi-
bility of improving upon it. This project comes to grief, however, when 
a trade-off exists between respecting the protection standard and pre-
serving the opportunity for welfare-improving settlements. A trade-off 
may arise either because an antitrust rule cannot be found that 
achieves both goals, or because the rule that achieves both is very 
costly to enforce. The protection standard requires that any trade-off 
between protecting consumers from harm and preserving the oppor-
tunity to make them better off must be resolved in favor of protecting 
consumers from harm.99 
 The notion that patent law chooses the litigation entry date to max-
imize consumer welfare in litigation conflicts with the view that patent 
law’s choice of the patent term, which is twenty years at present, rep-
                                                                                                                       
period, and thus undermines optimal innovation incentives, if it excludes rivals for a per-
centage of the remaining patent period that exceeds the percentage chance of a patent vic-
tory.”); Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation Settle-
ments: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 38 (2004) (“Congress has already cor-
rectly maximized the static versus dynamic trade-off in creating the patent rules and proce-
dures.”); Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy Over Patent Settlements: 
Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, in 21 RESEARCH IN  
LAW & ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 475, 487 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter Leffler & Leffler, Settling the Controversy] (“[T]he task of antitrust law . . . [is] 
to distinguish between those settlements in which exclusion of the competitor results from 
the bundle of substantive and procedural rights granted to the patent holder by Congress as 
a reward for innovation, and those in which the exclusion does not result from those rights.”). 
In multiple entry, maximum settlement value does not always exceed maximum litiga-
tion value, and so in this case the argument might be that in the drug market litigation value 
is the global maximum. My estimates do not support this position. See Woodcock, Product 
Innovation, supra note 18, at 26 (estimating that some positive amount of delay in settlement 
relative to the litigation entry date makes consumers better off, which implies that at the 
litigation entry date settlement welfare exceeds litigation welfare). 
 99. Two other commentators appear to support this rule, but on error cost grounds, 
rather than as a matter of institutional deference. Leffler & Leffler, Settling the Controversy, 
supra note 98, at 485 (arguing in the context of the static model that “the potential welfare 
losses from the unlikely error of preventing an efficient settlement will be far outweighed by 
the gains from preventing inefficient settlements that perpetuate monopoly”). Michael Ow-
ens makes a similar point when he argues that the cost of false positives in banning reverse 
payments must be far less than the cost of false negatives associated with the ‘scope of the 
patent’ test, which is akin to laissez faire. See Michael Owens, Comment, A Cure for Collu-
sive Settlements: The Case for a Per Se Prohibition on Pay-for-Delay Agreements in Phar-
maceutical Patent Litigation, 78 MO. L. REV. 1353, 1393 (2013). 
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resents the amount of delay patent law believes is optimal for any pa-
tent.100 The value of a patent comes not from the patent term per se 
but the expected entry date that the term, along with many other fac-
tors, creates.101  There is always some risk of patent invalidity or non-
infringement; so a firm planning its research and development ex-
penditures makes plans based on an expected date of entry that is al-
ways somewhat sooner than the date of expiration of the patent term. 
To the extent that patent law wishes to optimize consumer welfare, it 
must therefore push the litigation entry date, not the patent term, to-
ward the optimal date. Tools it can use to do this include not just the 
patent term but also the rules of validity and infringement. 
 In deferring to patent law’s determination of the optimal level of 
delay, antitrust is not so naïve as to suppose that patent law succeeds 
at choosing the optimal date, or even makes a choice consciously in the 
sense that patent law anticipates how all its rule choices add up to a 
particular litigation entry date for a particular patent. Rather, anti-
trust has the role of a functionary who must do her job regardless 
whether the other bureaucrats succeed at doing theirs. The hope is 
that one day, once patent law has gotten its act together, patent law’s 
decisions will maximize consumer welfare and therefore antitrust’s de-
fense of them will become useful. 
 For a number of reasons, it is unlikely that the litigation entry 
dates chosen by patent law today in fact maximize expected consumer 
welfare in litigation. The rules of validity and infringement, as well as 
the patent term, are of limited use in tailoring the litigation entry date 
to the details of any particular invention. In order for the entry date 
to be optimal, judges would need to understand their role to be not 
only deciding whether a patent is enforceable but also manipulating 
the expectations of potential litigants to create an optimal expected 
entry date. For example, if a judge were to know that entry after expi-
ration of half of the patent term is optimal in a particular type of case, 
then the judge would need to craft her opinions in cases of that type to 
                                                                                                                       
 100. Settlement takes place in the shadow of the law and it is therefore conceivable that 
patent law might use its rules to produce the welfare maximizing settlement outcome. As-
suming this assumes away the patent settlement problem in most cases. It would place con-
sumers at the peak in the settlement value lines in Figure 3 supra and in Figure 4 infra, 
even in the absence of antitrust intervention. For a possible exception, see discussion supra 
note 98 ¶ 2. 
Firms, however, must also incorporate the possibility of settlement into their expecta-
tions. Antitrust regulates settlement to ensure that consumer welfare does not fall below the 
level that would obtain were litigation the only option. For a discussion of the effect of the 
probability of settlement upon firm expectations, see Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra 
note 18, at 17-18. 
 101. See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 395.  
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make branded drug makers believe that in future they would win in 
those cases only half the time. 
 Judges have a different view of their mission. They understand 
their mission to be to make as clear as possible to future litigants how 
judges will rule in particular cases.102 In the patent context, judges see 
their mission as making clear whether they will enforce the patent, 
allowing entry only at the expiration of the patent’s term, or not en-
force the patent, allowing immediate entry.103 Their goal is to drive 
expectations as close to the extremes of immediate entry or entry at 
patent expiry as possible. 
 One might argue that this could still mean that judges drive expec-
tations to optimal levels if the optimal levels are always either imme-
diate entry or entry at the patent expiration date. But to make this 
argument one must assume that a one-size-fits-all patent term com-
bined with the rules of patent validity and infringement are optimal. 
In other words, all inventions that confer value on consumers are pa-
tentable and the appropriate level of investment in research and de-
velopment in generating them is induced through the same twenty-
year term104 in all cases. Further, one must assume that all inventions 
that do not confer value on consumers are not patentable. These are 
not defensible positions.105 The deference of antitrust to patent is a 
matter of institutional division of labor, not of belief that patent law 
can be relied upon to achieve optimal outcomes. 
IV.   ENTRY SETTLEMENTS IN A DYNAMIC MODEL 
 Under antitrust’s protection standard, the best rule for entry set-
tlements is a ban, even when gains from innovation arising from delay 
in market entry are taken into account. Alternative rules that ban or 
limit the size of reverse payments create a risk that drug companies 
                                                                                                                       
 102. See generally Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: 
Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1027, 1030 
(2011) (“The U.S. legal system has adopted a host of features that enhance legal clarity, chief 
of which is the adoption of stare decisis . . . .”). 
 103. Entry is immediate if the patent is invalid or noninfringed. Entry takes place at 
patent expiry if the patent is both valid and infringed. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928-30 (2015) (distinguishing patent validity and infringement). 
 104. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (setting a twenty-year patent term). 
 105. See William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An 
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 267-72 (1966) (“It is . . . true that the Congressional judg-
ment of ‘how much’ [protection to give innovation by setting the patent term] was made with 
no explicit attention to the nature of the problem [of balancing gains from innovation against 
the social costs of monopoly.]”); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1497 (arguing that 
“the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’), which grants patents] doesn’t do a very de-
tailed job of examining patents . . . . It is ‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of patents, 
in economics lingo, because it is too costly for the PTO to discover those facts”). 
800  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:773 
  
will settle for enough delay to harm consumers, even after gains from 
innovation are taken into account. Given uncertainty regarding 
whether drug companies will actually make harmful settlements un-
der alternative rules of this kind, the uncertainty corollary to the pro-
tection standard requires that antitrust avoid the risk entirely by not 
implementing those rules.106 A settlement ban is not the only rule that 
guarantees no harm to consumers, but relative to the alternatives of a 
rule of reason or a rule allowing a representative of the consumer in-
terest such as the FTC to supervise settlements as they are being 
made, it is the least expensive to enforce. 
 A settlement ban is appropriate under the protection standard be-
cause that standard does not seek to preserve the freedom of drug 
makers to make settlements that improve the welfare of consumers 
relative to litigation. The standard that seeks to preserve that freedom 
is the maximization standard, which requires that antitrust maximize 
consumer welfare. Antitrust does not employ the maximization stand-
ard for patent settlements, but the focus of the reverse payment debate 
on preserving settlements that might benefit consumers suggests that 
at least some commentators are partial to that rule.107 The maximiza-
tion standard does not, however, support adoption of a rule of reason, 
as these commentators suggest, even after gains from innovation are 
taken into account.108 The maximization standard supports a rule re-
quiring supervision of all settlements by the FTC or some other repre-
sentative of the consumer interest. Only supervision ensures that the 
settlement the parties choose in fact maximizes consumer welfare. 
Other alternatives, such as a rule of reason or a rule limiting the size 
of any reverse payment, would give drug makers the freedom to choose 
from a range of settlements that make consumers better off relative to 
litigation, but none would push the parties to choose a particular set-
tlement that maximizes consumer welfare, as supervision would. 
A.   The Innovation Grace Period 
 Incorporating innovation into the static model of entry settlements 
creates a period of delay in entry under settlement, relative to the lit-
igation entry date, for which consumers are better off under settlement 
than under litigation. An entry date anywhere within this grace period 
makes consumers at least as well off as they would be under litigation 
because over this range the consumer harm from higher prices is not 
so large as to fully counteract the increase in consumer welfare due to 
                                                                                                                       
 106. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra note 14. 
 108. See id. 
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higher profits and the resulting innovation. In Figure 3, this period is 
the length of the line from Point C to Point D.109  
 For delay beyond this period, however, the effect of the higher 
prices becomes too great, and consumers are better off without the ex-
tra innovation. Any antitrust rule that prevents delay beyond the 
grace period meets the protection standard by rendering consumer 
harm impossible. Both a settlement ban and a rule of reason meet this 
requirement: the former because it allows no delay at all, and the lat-
ter because it carefully identifies and condemns all those settlements 
that delay entry too long. Settlement supervision also meets this re-
quirement, assuming that the supervisor does not do too poor a job of 
protecting the consumer interest in settlement negotiations.  
 There is no reason to suppose a priori that a limit on the size of a 
reverse payment prevents delay beyond the grace period. Whether a 
limit prevents excessive delay depends on the peculiar characteristics 
of the market for the drug at issue in any given case, including the 
extent to which price falls after entry of generics. In another work, I 
estimate the amount of delay to which drug makers would find it prof-
itable to agree. For the average drug, the estimates show that delay 
sufficient to harm consumers is possible under a rule limiting any re-
verse payment to Brand’s litigation cost or a rule prohibiting any re-
verse payment.110 This happens when multiple generics enter the mar-
ket together, driving price to low levels.111  
 By contrast, in the single entry case, in which only a small number 
of generic makers enter the market before patent expiry and price falls 
modestly, firms will not agree to sufficient delay to harm consumers, 
even when there is a reverse payment equal to litigation cost.112 In-
deed, I find that in the single entry case settlements involving a re-
verse payment in excess of litigation cost also may not allow delay suf-
ficient to harm consumers. This adds innovation to the growing list of 
adjustments to the static model that demonstrate that a rule limiting 
reverse payments to litigation cost would preclude some settlements 
that benefit consumers, contrary to the claims of advocates of that lit-
igation cost rule.113 
                                                                                                                       
 109. See Figure 3 supra. 
 110. See Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 28. 
 111. For a discussion of multiple entry, see supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 112. For a discussion of the single entry case, see supra text accompanying note 50. 
 113. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 27, at 85-86 (arguing that a litigation cost rule 
precludes beneficial settlements when the branded drug maker is risk averse); Willig & Bi-
gelow, supra note 14, at 660 (arguing that reverse payments are necessary for beneficial 
settlements when firms have inaccurate assessments of the chance of winning the litigation). 
Suppose in Figure 3 supra that point K represents the maximum amount of delay to which 
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B.   Comparison of Options for Regulating Drug Patent Settlements 
 I consider whether the following rules meet the uncertainty corol-
lary to the protection standard114: (1) a rule of reason, which the Court 
in Actavis imposed on entry settlements containing a reverse pay-
ment;115 (2) no regulation of patent entry settlements (‘laissez faire’); 
(3) a per se rule against all patent entry settlements (‘settlement ban’); 
(4) a per se rule against all patent entry settlements involving a re-
verse payment (‘payment ban’); (5) a per se rule against all patent en-
try settlements involving a payment in excess of litigation cost or some 
other threshold amount (‘litigation cost rule’ or ‘small payment ban’); 
and (6) a rule allowing the FTC, acting as consumer representative, to 
become party to any patent litigation (‘supervision rule’). Only a set-
tlement ban, rule of reason, and supervision rule satisfy the uncer-
tainty corollary in both single and multiple entry. 
 I undertake the analysis of each rule first by reference to Figure 3, 
which gives consumer welfare in the single entry case for the average 
drug, taking my estimates into account.116 I extend the analysis to the 
multiple entry case in Section IV.B.8. 
1.   Assumptions 
 In comparing the rules, I make the following assumptions. 
1) The litigation entry date falls before the patent expira-
tion date. My estimates for the average drug show that 
this holds.117 
                                                                                                                       
Generic is willing to agree in exchange for a payment equal to Brand’s litigation cost. Because 
the delay represented by this intersection is substantially less than the delay associated with 
consumer harm (point D), there exist payments in excess of litigation cost that buy delay that 
falls between points K and D and therefore do not harm consumers. See Figure 3 supra. 
 114. See supra note 73. 
 115. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235-37 (2013). For a discus-
sion of the current rule, see infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Figure 3 supra. I describe the model that generates this figure in Woodcock, 
Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 7-16. 
 117. See id. at 63 (reporting estimates of “optimal patent strength”). If the litigation en-
try date were to fall instead at patent expiry, then delay would be impossible and reverse 
payments of no concern, given that the courts already ban agreements extending the patent 
term. By contrast, many argue that inventors capture too little of the gains from innovation, 
which might suggest that optimal entry lies at or even beyond patent expiry. See, e.g., Den-
icolò, supra note 18, at 713 (finding that patents do not over-compensate innovators at pre-
sent); William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and 
Measurement 22 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10433, 2004) (estimating 
that only 2.2% “of the total present value of social returns to innovation are captured by 
innovators”), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10433 [https://perma.cc/8Q89-3YKJ]. 
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2) The uncertainty corollary to the protection standard, 
which prohibits any rule that allows the possibility of con-
sumer harm, applies.118 Because delay of excessive length 
leads to harm, the maximum delay allowed by each rule 
determines whether it meets the standard. 
3) Generic’s expectations regarding litigation are either opti-
mistic or accurate, but never pessimistic.119 If Generic is 
pessimistic, then Generic may agree to large amounts of 
delay because Generic believes that it will probably lose the 
litigation and be excluded from the market until patent ex-
piry in any case. By eliminating this scenario, this assump-
tion places a cap on the amount of delay that any reverse 
payment rule will allow, which preserves the possibility 
that some rules will meet the uncertainty corollary.120 
4) The grace period of delay, during which consumers are not 
harmed relative to litigation, does not extend until patent 
expiry. That is, delay until patent expiry harms consumers 
relative to litigation. This is reflected in Figure 3, which 
shows consumer welfare at Point A falling below consumer 
welfare at Point C, which is consumer welfare under liti-
gation.121 This assumption is based on my estimates re-
garding the grace period for the average drug.122 
5) The maximum delay possible under settlement without a 
reverse payment or with a payment capped at litigation 
cost is not enough to harm consumers. In Figure 3, settle-
ment without a reverse payment can involve no delay be-
yond Point B and settlement with a litigation cost pay-
ment can involve no delay beyond Point K. This assump-
tion is also based on my estimates.123 
                                                                                                                       
 118. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 672-73 (discussing the role of optimism in 
reverse payment settlements). 
 120. Cf. Davis, supra note 16, at 299 (arguing that Generic is likely to be pessimistic 
about its litigation prospects whereas Brand is not). 
 121. See Figure 3 supra. 
 122. See Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 26, 28 (reporting “upper 
bound[s]” on the “delay threshold” for most patent strengths in the cases of both single entry, 
called “capped duopoly,” and multiple entry, called “fixed duopoly”). 
 123. See id. (reporting estimates, for the average drug, of the maximum delay to which 
Generic will agree in exchange for a reverse payment in an amount up to litigation cost). For a 
discussion of why a maximum level of delay exists, see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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6) Brand’s expectations regarding litigation are always  
accurate.124 
7) No rule allows hastening of entry through settlement. This 
assumption simplifies the argument, but contributes noth-
ing to the results. It is also highly artificial, because all of 
the rules considered in this Article in fact allow some has-
tening, with the exception of the settlement ban.125  
8) All cases look like the average case. If not, then assump-
tions 1, 4, and 5, all of which are based on my estimates 
for the average case, do not hold for all cases. 
 A rule complies with the uncertainty corollary if the maximum de-
lay that the rule allows is associated with a level of welfare on the 
settlement consumer welfare curve, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 in Figure 3, that is below 
consumer welfare in litigation, Point C.126 Equivalently, a rule com-
plies if the maximum delay allowed by the rule exceeds the level of delay 
at Point D on the consumer welfare curve, which gives the point at 
which welfare in settlement equals welfare in litigation at Point C.127 
2.   Laissez Faire 
 If antitrust does not regulate patent settlements, then drug makers 
are free to delay entry until the expiration of the patent, which corre-
sponds to Point A in Figure 3. By Assumption (4), consumers are better 
off under litigation, putting Point C above Point A. As a result, laissez 
faire harms consumers and violates the uncertainty corollary. This re-
sult establishes a basis for antitrust regulation of entry settlements in 
a model that accounts for innovation. The result provides support for 
the Court’s decision in Actavis to abandon laissez faire.128 
                                                                                                                       
 124. See Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 11. If Brand’s expectations are 
not accurate, or at least the same as the researcher who is calculating consumer welfare, 
then depending on Brand’s expectations any settlement outcome is possible and the model 
useless. For example, if Brand thinks mistakenly that it will lose the litigation, then it is 
willing to settle for any entry date. Cf. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 673, 692-96 (mod-
eling dates at which Brand and Generic are willing to settle when either may have inaccu-
rate expectations of litigation success).  
 125. For example, under a rule of reason the parties may settle for any entry date that 
leaves consumers no worse off than they are at Point C in Figure 3 supra. This implies that 
settlements that delay past point D are illegal under the rule, as are all settlements for entry 
dates to the right of that date corresponding to Point C and to the left of that date corresponding 
to the intersection of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 and a horizontal line drawn leftward from Point C (not shown).  
 126. See Figure 3 supra. 
 127. See Figure 3 supra. 
 128. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235-37 (2013). 
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3.   Settlement Ban 
 If antitrust bans patent settlements, then entry is determined by 
the courts, which choose the date that corresponds to the welfare max-
imum under litigation, Point C. Because the uncertainty corollary re-
quires precisely that welfare not fall below Point C, a settlement ban 
complies with the corollary. 
4.   Payment Ban 
 If antitrust bans reverse payments, but allows entry settlements 
that do not involve a reverse payment, then my estimates show that 
for the average drug the greatest delay does not exceed the grace pe-
riod, falling instead at Point B, per Assumption (5). The settlement 
range is HB in Figure 3.129 Point H is welfare for a settlement at  
the litigation entry date, which is the lower bound of the settlement  
range by assumption (6). No settlement that harms consumers  
relative to Point C is possible under this rule. It therefore meets the  
uncertainty corollary. 
5.   Litigation Cost Rule/Small Payment Ban 
 If antitrust limits the size of a reverse payment to the branded 
maker’s litigation cost, or any amount less than that, then according 
to my estimates for the average drug, delay does not exceed the grace 
period, falling instead at Point K, per Assumption (5). Point K is below 
point B, which gives settlement under a payment ban, because a rule 
that allows a payment, even one limited to litigation cost, allows more 
delay than a rule allowing no payment, and therefore leads to lower 
consumer welfare. The settlement region is HK. It is clear that, like a 
payment ban, a litigation cost rule allows no harm to consumers  
relative to litigation and therefore meets the requirement of the  
uncertainty corollary.  
 A cautionary observation regarding this conclusion is in order. The 
choice of litigation cost as a reverse payment cap is arbitrary. The pro-
ponents of the rule developed it in the belief that litigation cost is a 
marker of consumer harm;130 but this Article131 and others132 have 
shown that hypothesis to be false. The rule is desirable only to the ex-
tent that it provides for a level of payment that is small enough that 
                                                                                                                       
 129. See Figure 3 supra. 
 130. See, e.g., Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, supra note 16, at 22 (insisting that con-
sumer harm arises “if (but only if) the reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s avoided 
litigation costs”). 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 113.  
 132. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 14, at 677. 
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consumers cannot be harmed. Any small payment will do. For this rea-
son, I sometimes refer to the litigation cost rule as the small payment 
rule.  
6.   Rule of Reason 
 A rule of reason condemns only those entry settlements that harm 
consumers relative to litigation.133 The greatest delay allowed by the 
rule therefore corresponds to Point D, the last point before consumers 
are harmed. The settlement range is therefore HD. Assuming that the 
rule is applied without error, it allows no harm to consumers and 
therefore satisfies the uncertainty corollary.  
7.   Making Consumers Party to Patent Litigation 
 Another possible solution to the entry settlement problem is to 
make a consumer representative an indispensable party to any patent 
suit.134 Settlement outcomes approximate litigation outcomes only if 
the balance of interests in settlement negotiations approximates the 
balance of interests protected by the law.135 Settlements that harm 
consumers are possible because consumers are not part of settlement 
                                                                                                                       
 133. The Court in Actavis authorized a rule of reason inquiry into the existence of “un-
justified anticompetitive harm,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236, but provided no guidance on the 
baseline against which such harm ought be measured. I assume that the Court would impose 
the baseline accepted by the literature, that of consumer welfare under litigation. See supra 
Section III.C. 
 134. One approach would be for the FTC to intervene in every patent suit that could give 
rise to an entry settlement. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) gives a non-party to a 
suit a right to intervene if the non-party “claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as 
a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 24(a)(2). The FTC could argue that its interest in enforcing the antitrust laws suffices. See 
Amy M. Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Require-
ments for Rule 24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 687 (2002) (“[I]ntervention is fre-
quently relied upon by groups attempting to protect the public interest. Examples  
include . . . governmental entities intervening in private litigation . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
But see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (observing, in a reverse payment settlement case, that the “concept of a pub-
lic property right in the outcome of private lawsuits does not translate well into the realities 
of litigation, and there is no support in the law for such a right”). Another approach would 
be to allow buyers to challenge patents. See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 8, at 292 (“Be-
cause the underlying problem that allows anticompetitive settlements is that patent law 
does not ordinarily give buyers standing to challenge dubious patents, a possible procedural 
solution would provide that when such settlements are reached buyers should have standing 
to challenge the patent’s validity.”).  
 135. See Davis, supra note 16, at 261-62 (arguing that when the interests of consumers 
and Generic are aligned, the settlement entry date will approximate the expected entry date 
under litigation). For more on the theory that when all the interests represented by the law 
negotiate settlement the terms will approximate those that would be achieved through liti-
gation, see Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 125-27. 
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negotiations.136 At present, the judge, as the guardian of a patent re-
gime that incorporates the interests of consumers, is the only defender 
of consumer interests in patent litigation between drug makers. But 
the judge is not at the table when a settlement is negotiated and there-
fore consumer interests are not reflected in settlement terms.137 The 
solution might be to make the FTC, acting as a defender of the con-
sumer interest,138 an indispensable party to any patent litigation.139 
The FTC would therefore also be an essential party to any settlement, 
bringing the balance of interests in settlement into line with the bal-
ance of interests in patent law generally.  
 In bringing all the interests protected by the law to the settlement 
table, supervision of settlements drives the entry date under settle-
ment toward the litigation entry date, but because settlement saves 
litigation costs, consumer welfare increases relative to litigation, from 
Point C to Point H. There is no consumer harm under a supervision 
rule, so it meets the uncertainty corollary.  
                                                                                                                       
 136. See Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 126-27. 
 137. See, e.g., Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 835 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (“Our federal courts have neither the authority nor the resources to review and 
approve the settlement of every case brought in the federal court system. There are only 
certain designated types of suits, for instance consent decrees, class actions, shareholder 
derivative suits, and compromises of bankruptcy claims where settlement of the suit requires 
court approval.”). 
 138. The FTC is empowered to enforce the antitrust laws, see, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n 
v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1948) (stating that “the Sherman Act and the Trade 
Commission Act provide the Government with cumulative remedies against activity detri-
mental to competition”), which have the goal of protecting the consumer interest. See supra 
note 48. 
 139. The authority of the FTC has been held to extend to stopping anticompetitive prac-
tices in their ‘incipiency.’ Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 322 
(1966) (“[T]he Commission has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency 
without proof that they amount to an outright violation of . . . the antitrust laws.”). Allowing 
the FTC to represent consumers in patent settlement negotiations, thereby forestalling set-
tlements that harm consumers, is in the spirit of the FTC’s ‘incipiency’ authority. Cf. Cement 
Inst., 333 U.S. at 693 (“All of the committee reports and the statements of those in charge of 
the Trade Commission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Commission and the 
courts with adequate powers to hit at every trade practice, then existing or thereafter con-
trived, which restrained competition or might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its 
incipient stages.”). Whether this could be accomplished without Congressional action is be-
yond the scope of this article. I note, however, that Congress has already dabbled in the 
authorization of third-party rights in patent cases by authorizing inter partes review. 35 
U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (allowing “a person who is not the owner of a patent” to challenge the 
patent based on prior art before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). 

2017]  INNOVATION AND REVERSE PAYMENTS 809 
  
The generic maker is therefore willing to agree to any amount of delay 
demanded by Brand as a condition of settlement, so long as the generic 
maker obtains those 180 days of exclusivity.143 
 As a result of the shorter grace period, and increased levels of delay 
under settlement, maximum delay under the payment and small pay-
ment bans is now long enough to harm consumers, causing both of 
these rules now to fail the uncertainty corollary. In Figure 4, Points B 
and K, corresponding to the payment and small payment bans, now 
fall below Point C, reflecting harm to consumers relative to litiga-
tion.144 The analyses of the other rules remain the same. 
9.   Results 
 Table 1 summarizes my results. A settlement ban, rule of reason, 
or supervision rule satisfy the uncertainty corollary in both single and 
multiple entry. Laissez faire fails to satisfy the corollary in both. Pay-
ment and small payment bans only guarantee no harm in single entry. 
Assuming that it is not easy to distinguish single and multiple entry 
cases in advance, a rule must guarantee no harm to consumers in both 
cases in order to meet the uncertainty corollary. Compliance with the 
corollary in both cases is particularly important because multiple en-
try, for which consumers are harmed under the payment and small 
payment bans, is common.145 Both types of payment rule therefore fail 
the uncertainty corollary.146  
 
                                                                                                                       
 143. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 16, at 1593 (“For the generic firm, an 
earlier entry date is better, given the higher present value of earlier payment, but only mod-
estly so. Enjoying the exclusivity period with certainty is more important to a generic firm 
than its timing. In fact, if future market demand is anticipated to increase, a generic firm 
might prefer the later entry date, so long as the increase in projected profits exceeds the 
discount from the delay in their receipt.”). 
 144. See Figure 4 supra. 
 145. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 629; Kobayashi et al., supra 
note 14, at 89 (describing multiple entry as “typical”).  
 146. I have not considered a requirement that Generic make a minimum obverse pay-
ment to Brand as part of any settlement, even though in theory an obverse payment require-
ment might prevent settlement for excessive delay. The objections to antitrust adoption of 
such a requirement apply regardless whether innovation gains are taken into account. See 
Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 146-48 (outlining the rule 
and objections to it). 




Meets uncertainty  
corollary 
Meets maximization  
standard (rank) 
Single entry Multiple  
entry 
Single entry Multiple  
entry 
Settlement ban Yes Yes Yes (5) Yes (3) 
Supervision 
rule 
Yes Yes Yes (1) Yes (1) 
Rule of  
reason Yes Yes Yes (4) Yes (2) 
Payment ban Yes No Yes (2) No 
Litigation cost 
rule / small 
payment ban 
Yes No Yes (3) No 
Laissez faire No No No No 
C.   A Settlement Ban Is the Least Costly Option 
 Of the three rules that satisfy the uncertainty corollary, antitrust 
should apply the settlement ban because it is least costly to enforce.147 
Enforcement cost is the cost to antitrust enforcers, whether the gov-
ernment or private plaintiffs, of enforcing a rule against parties to an 
entry settlement. A settlement ban is less expensive to enforce than a 
rule of reason because it requires only interpretation of the terms of 
the settlement agreement, whereas a rule of reason requires interpre-
tation of the terms at a minimum and sometimes determination of the 
litigation entry date as well.148 A settlement ban is less expensive than 
a supervision rule because, like a rule of reason, a supervision rule 
requires enforcers to identify the litigation entry date. Otherwise, en-
forcers cannot know which settlement offers to reject. 
 Litigation cost is the cost to settling firms of litigating the patent 
challenge through to a conclusion. Litigation cost provides no basis for 
choosing between rules that already satisfy the uncertainty corollary 
because litigation cost savings are already taken into account in decid-
ing compliance with the corollary, which requires a determination 
whether litigation cost savings from settlement compensate for wel-
fare losses associated with delay. 
 By contrast, error costs are accounted for here only in part. Error 
costs are the costs of mistakenly condemning settlements that benefit 
                                                                                                                       
 147. Many of the points in this Section IV.C follow id. at 140-41, 144-48. For more on 
how a settlement ban might be administered, see id. at 141-44. 
 148. See id. at 145-46. 
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consumers and failing to condemn those that harm them.149 Error costs 
implicitly play a role in the formulation of the uncertainty corollary. 
Under the protection standard, settlements that make consumers bet-
ter off relative to their welfare under litigation are irrelevant because 
the standard seeks only to eliminate harm. Therefore there can be no 
error cost from condemning beneficial settlements. The uncertainty 
corollary eliminates the cost of failing to condemn harmful settlements 
by approving only rules that guarantee no harm. To the extent that 
they are accounted for under the uncertainty corollary in this way, er-
ror costs provide no basis for choosing between rules that all satisfy 
the uncertainty corollary. The uncertainty corollary does not, however, 
take account of error costs that arise from the imperfect administra-
tion of a rule. For example, courts sometimes fail accurately to distin-
guish good from bad conduct in applying a rule of reason.150 To the 
extent that error costs are not accounted for under the uncertainty 
corollary, I ignore them. I also ignore court administration costs.  
D.   Results Under a Maximization Rule 
 The maximization standard requires that antitrust choose the rule 
that makes consumers best off, rather than any rule that preserves 
consumers from harm. When there is uncertainty about the amount of 
delay to which firms will agree in settlement, the best rule under a 
maximization standard allows the smallest number of entry dates as-
sociated with the highest levels of consumer welfare. For the supervi-
sion rule, payment bans, or rule of reason, which nest allowed entry 
dates, this approach to uncertainty makes the level of welfare at the 
point of maximum delay allowed under a rule the criterion for deter-
mining whether a rule meets the maximization standard.151 The only 
difference between this criterion and that under the protection stand-
ard is that welfare at maximum delay must equal maximum welfare 
                                                                                                                       
 149. See generally Ramsi A. Woodcock, Per Se in Itself: How Bans Reduce Error in Anti-
trust (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing error costs in antitrust adjudication), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2896453 [https://perma.cc/LD33-CDW8]. 
 150. See, e.g., Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Opti-
mally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION  
L. & ECON. 215, 227 (2006) (identifying error costs associated with “differentiated rules,” 
such as rules of reason); Juwon Kwak, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: Information Cost 
and Deterrent Effect, 41 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 371 (2016) (modeling rule of reason error costs). 
 151. This may be put another way. Because welfare in settlement is falling with delay, 
as shown in Figure 3 supra, if one rule allows more delay in settlement than the other, then 
it allows some settlements with lower welfare than those allowed by the other. Assuming 
that the choice of rule does not change which cases settle and that settlement entry dates 
are uniformly distributed over available settlement dates, the rule that allows less delay 
dominates. When two rules allow the same amount of delay, the rule that affords greater or 
equal settlement welfare for any given entry date dominates. 
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in settlement to satisfy the maximization rule, instead of maximum 
welfare in litigation, as required under the protection standard.  
 The supervision rule is the best rule under the maximization stand-
ard because it guarantees settlement at the litigation entry date, al-
lowing consumers to benefit from avoidance of litigation costs without 
suffering losses from delay. Next come the payment ban, small pay-
ment ban, and rule of reason, in that order, because each allows pro-
gressively more delay. A settlement ban comes last because although 
it allows no more harm to consumers than a rule of reason,152 it elimi-
nates the possibility of beneficial settlements. In multiple entry, pay-
ment and small payment bans cease to be contenders because they al-
low harm to consumers, but a supervision rule, rule of reason, and set-
tlement ban retain their relative rankings.153 
E.   Consequences for Actavis 
1.   The Decision Does Not Go Far Enough 
 The rule of reason imposed by Actavis is defective both because a 
settlement ban is a less costly alternative that is equally effective at 
meeting antitrust’s protection standard and because the Court applied 
the rule of reason only to the subset of entry settlements that involve 
a reverse payment. Actavis exposes drug patent entry settlements in-
                                                                                                                       
 152. I assume that a rule of reason would continue to take litigation welfare as a baseline 
in condemning settlements that harm consumers, even though as a technical matter under 
a maximization standard harm is measured against maximum settlement welfare. If a rule 
of reason were to measure harm in the latter fashion, then only the settlement that maxim-
izes welfare would be legal under a rule of reason, and a rule of reason would have the same 
effect as a supervision rule. Indeed, it might do better than a supervision rule given that a 
supervision rule tends to produce entry at the litigation-welfare-maximizing date, but a rule 
of reason would allow entry only at the settlement-welfare-maximizing date. The two are not 
necessarily the same.  
 153. Regulation discourages settlement. Some parties who would do a deal in laissez 
faire will fail to do a deal under another regime either because the regime causes bargaining 
over mutually beneficial settlements to break down or asymmetric information prevents set-
tlement. Because the alternative to settlement is litigation, this means that every form of 
regulation pushes average value in the direction of Point C in Figure 3 supra, which is con-
sumer welfare under litigation, to some extent. This has no effect on analysis under a pro-
tection standard because that standard is only interested in reductions in consumer welfare 
relative to Point C. Whether welfare under a particular regime lies above or below welfare 
at Point C does not change if it is pushed in the direction of Point C. 
        But settlement discouragement does complicate analysis under a maximization stand-
ard. Consumer welfare at maximum delay can no longer be used to compare regulatory ap-
proaches under that standard. If a supervision rule discourages settlement to a much greater 
extent than a rule of reason, for example, then average settlement value under a supervision 
rule might fall below that under a rule of reason. My maximization standard rests on as-
sumptions that sidestep this problem. See supra note 151. 
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volving a reverse payment to rule of reason review and entry settle-
ments involving reverse payments in excess of litigation cost in partic-
ular to a rebuttable presumption of illegality as part of this review.154 
The decision does not cover entry settlements that involve no reverse 
payment155 and therefore reaches only a small part of the universe of 
drug patent entry settlements. For fiscal year 2014, the FTC reports 
that of 160 settlements arising out of Paragraph IV litigation, 111, or 
69%, “restrict the generic manufacturer’s ability to market its product 
but contain no” reverse payment.156 Although Actavis appears to have 
driven down the share of settlements involving a reverse payment,157 
the share of settlements fixing a date of entry, with or without a re-
verse payment, has remained roughly constant, suggesting that the 
entry settlement problem has escaped its reach.158 To the extent that 
                                                                                                                       
 154. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237-38 (2013); Edlin et al., The 
Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 585 (“The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: 
a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reason-
able inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.”); Hovenkamp, Anticompeti-
tive Patent Settlements, supra note 1, at 5-6 (“[Actavis holds that a] large settlement exclusion 
payment disproportionate to litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust’s rule of reason, 
without inquiry into whether the patent is actually invalid or not infringed, and even if the 
settlement agreement does not go ‘beyond the scope’ of the patent’s nominal coverage.”).  
It is not altogether clear whether Actavis wishes settlements involving reverse payments 
falling below litigation cost to be subject to any antitrust scrutiny. The opinion focuses on rule 
of reason treatment for reverse payments “where large and unjustified.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2237. But commentators seem to understand it to permit rule of reason scrutiny for all reverse 
payment settlements. See, e.g., Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 27, at 611. 
 155. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (“[T]he fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment 
risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit. They 
may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for example, by allowing the generic man-
ufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the pa-
tentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”). 
 156. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, 
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2014 2 (2016) 
[hereinafter BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FY 2014], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-
commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8G8-5NWG]. The FTC is likely to have a complete set of settlements of Par-
agraph IV litigation because there is a statutory reporting requirement. See Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, § 1112(a)(1), 
117 Stat. 2066, 2462.  
 157. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
AGREEMENTS FY 2014, supra note 156, at 1 (“[T]he number of settlements potentially involv-
ing pay for delay decreased significantly in the wake of the Actavis decision.”). 
 158. Of 140 settlements in the last full year before Actavis, 121 were entry settlements, 
which may or may not include a reverse payment, and of 160 settlements in the first full 
year after the decision, 140 were entry settlements, which again may or may not include a 
reverse payment, constituting an increase in entry settlements of about 1%. Compare 
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012 1 (2013), 
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entry settlements not covered by Actavis are per se legal,159 which Ac-
tavis suggests is the case,160 Actavis permits a laissez faire regime for 
these settlements that allows harm to consumers, even after account-
ing for gains from innovation.161 One thing the Court got right in Ac-
tavis was avoiding a payment ban or litigation cost rule, both of which 
fail the uncertainty corollary because they allow consumer harm.162  
2.   Improving on Actavis 
 Through an interpretation that is faithful to the economics of the 
problem, if not necessarily to the understanding of the majority opin-
ion in Actavis, the lower courts may extend Actavis to require rule of 
reason scrutiny of all entry settlements. Doing so would replace laissez 
faire treatment for the swath of entry settlements involving no reverse 
payment that are potentially harmful to consumers, with the better, if 
not the best, alternative of rule of reason review.  
 This extension would be accomplished by interpreting any value 
that Generic derives from an entry settlement, whether from Brand in 
the form of a traditional cash reverse payment, from the pre-expiry 
drug market in the form of profit, from the saving of litigation cost, or 
from anywhere else, as a ‘reverse payment’ for purposes of Actavis. 
This redefinition would cause all entry settlements to count as reverse 
payment settlements and thereby to qualify for rule of reason treat-
ment under Actavis.  
 This approach is faithful to the economics of the reverse payments 
problem because what is potentially harmful to consumers about a tra-
ditional reverse payment is not that it comes from Brand, but that it 
creates an incentive structure that fails to make settling for harmful 
levels of delay a loss-making proposition for at least one of the parties. 
                                                                                                                       
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-
trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mma-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKQ7-QCBH], with BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FED. TRADE COMM’N AGREEMENTS FY 2014, supra note 156, at 2. 
 159. Some appeals courts have held that all anticompetitive conduct is protected from 
antitrust liability so long as it does not extend the patent term. See Valley Drug Co. v. Ge-
neva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003); Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Pa-
tent Settlements, supra note 1, at 4-5 (providing an overview of this position and citing 
cases). To the extent that Actavis merely carves reverse payment settlements out of that rule 
of per se legality, settlements involving no reverse payment are per se legal. 
 160. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237; Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 16, at 1589, 
1589 n.147 (“An agreement that divides up the remaining term into monopoly and competi-
tion periods fits the widely accepted rule that an agreement on entry dates raises no anti-
competitive concern. The FTC, for example, has provided a safe harbor for agreements that 
set an entry date but include no cash payment from the innovator to the generic firm.”). 
 161. See supra Section IV.D. 
 162. See supra Sections IV.B.4, IV.B.5, IV.B.8. 
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A reverse payment in the traditional sense is only one of many ways 
in which value can be had from delay. 
 Consider the saving of litigation costs, which is a way in which 
value can be had from delay by both parties without a reverse pay-
ment.163 When the parties settle without a reverse payment, Generic 
may agree to delay if the litigation costs Generic saves provide suffi-
cient compensation for the profits Generic loses from the delay. The 
incentive to delay created by the litigation cost savings cannot mean-
ingfully be distinguished from the incentive effect that a reverse pay-
ment from Brand to Generic would have. The distinction cannot be 
that, in the case of a reverse payment, Brand makes a cash transfer to 
Generic, as simply allowing Generic directly to make a greater portion 
of future sales counts as a reverse payment.164 The distinction also can-
not be that, in the case of a reverse payment, Brand makes a transfer 
of value to Generic in the sense that the gain to Generic somehow cor-
responds to a loss to Brand.165 Suppose that Brand promises to turn 
50% of Brand’s future monopoly profits over to Generic in exchange for 
delay. That would surely count as a reverse payment, but it is hard to 
characterize Brand as losing 50% of its future monopoly profits here. 
Brand might have access to those profits if Brand were to win the liti-
gation. But when Brand settles, Brand has not won the litigation. If 
the settlement carves out those profits for Generic, then Brand neither 
ever had them nor ever will.  
 A more plausible, but still flawed, distinction between a reverse 
payment and litigation cost savings is that a reverse payment repre-
sents the use of the private surplus associated with monopoly to induce 
Generic to accept delay, whereas litigation cost savings are just that, 
cost savings, and not the fruits of monopoly. Allowing Generic to make 
some future sales directly or promising Generic a share of future mo-
nopoly profits are both ways of sharing monopoly profits, so they would 
count as reverse payments under this definition.  
 The trouble with this definition is underbreadth; it would exclude 
from the definition of reverse payment many of the settlements that 
would count as reverse payment settlements under Actavis. Suppose 
that Brand makes a payment to Generic for delay that is in excess of 
                                                                                                                       
 163. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 164. See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394 
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding that an agreement that Brand will not introduce its own generic ver-
sion of a drug [an “authorized generic”] to compete with that of Generic once Generic enters 
the market counts as a “reverse payment” under Actavis). 
 165. I differ on this point from Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 16, at 1582 
(“[S]ome conferral [of value upon Generic] is necessary in order for the parties to take joint 
advantage of the gain from trade.”). 
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Brand’s litigation cost. But suppose further that the delay Brand de-
mands in return is not greater than that to which Generic would agree 
anyway without a reverse payment in order to save litigation costs. It 
is not clear that the monopoly profit Brand shares with Generic 
through the payment is what induced Generic to settle for delay.166 
Generic is willing to settle for that level of delay even in the absence 
of a reverse payment. Under Actavis, the settlement would count as a 
reverse payment settlement and would probably trigger liability be-
cause of its size. In sum, it is difficult to characterize the antitrust sig-
nificance of a reverse payment as anything other than mere member-
ship in a broad set of mechanisms that create an incentive to settlement 
for delay.167 Extending the definition of reverse payment to include that 
entire set merely eliminates an arbitrary and unhelpful distinction. 
 My proposed extension of the definition of reverse payment to in-
clude any value that may be realized through settlement sweeps in all 
settlements because all settlements must have value to the parties in 
order for the parties to agree to them. The extension does not condemn 
all settlements, however, but merely subjects them to rule of reason 
review. It also sweeps in only entry settlements because Actavis only 
applies to settlements that both involve a reverse payment and fix a 
date of entry.168 Both elements are required.  
 It was of great importance to the Court in Actavis that the size of a 
reverse payment might be used to avoid the costly inquiry into the lit-
igation entry date that is otherwise necessary in determining whether 
                                                                                                                       
 166. See Woodcock, Uncertainty and Reverse Payments, supra note 24, at 117 n.66. 
 167. If the trigger for antitrust liability were a sharing of monopoly profit as an induce-
ment to behavior that leads to consumer harm, then many reverse payment settlements 
condemned under Actavis would be spared. Only a reverse payment settlement for delay in 
excess of the maximum delay to which Generic would agree without a payment would trigger 
liability. Without such a strict standard, however, it is difficult to think of antitrust as being 
about prohibiting conduct that exploits monopoly effects for private gain so much as being 
about a general prohibition on behavior that harms consumers, regardless whether the re-
wards of monopoly provide a necessary incentive. But much economic behavior may harm 
consumers incidentally. Laziness at work is an example. Antitrust’s current consumer harm 
standard seems overbroad; its overbreadth is perhaps remedied by the various non-economic 
requirements of antitrust law, such as the requirement of the existence of an agreement as 
a condition for liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION, 1-5 (2d ed. 2003) (outlining the requirement of an agreement for liability under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act).  
 168. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (giving as a general 
example of a reverse payment settlement an agreement pursuant to which Brand makes a 
payment to Generic and Generic is required “not to produce the patented product until the 
patent’s term expires”). 
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a settlement is harmful under a rule of reason.169 Under my proposed 
expansion in the definition of a reverse payment, the courts would po-
tentially be asked to decide many cases in which the absence of a re-
verse payment would prevent the courts from using reverse payment 
size to ascertain harm. I have two observations regarding this prob-
lem. First, while the Court seems happy in Actavis that reverse pay-
ment size might substitute for a costly inquiry into the litigation entry 
date in many cases,170 it does not rule out costly analysis where neces-
sary.171 Second, the burden of subjecting all entry settlements to full 
rule of reason review could push the Court toward acceptance of the 
less costly alternative of a settlement ban.  
V.   CONCLUSION  
 An enduring critique of antitrust is that it fails to take innovation 
into account and in so doing victimizes firms struggling to eke out 
enough monopoly power to pay for the research and innovation that 
have dramatically transformed the quality of life of consumers over 
the past few centuries.172 This charge would seem to have particular 
appeal in the context of reverse payment drug patent settlements be-
cause the promise of innovation is nowhere more urgent than where 
health is at stake.173 It is therefore a matter of some perplexity that 
the antitrust debate over these settlements has been conducted almost 
                                                                                                                       
 169. Id. at 2237 (“[A] court, by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to 
assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without litigat-
ing the validity of the patent . . . .”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See supra note 154. 
 172. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 
(1976) (“The firm of the type that is compatible with perfect competition is in many cases 
inferior in internal, especially technological, efficiency. . . . [I]t is not sufficient to argue that 
because perfect competition is impossible under modern industrial conditions—or because it 
always has been impossible—the large-scale establishment or unit of control must be ac-
cepted as a necessary evil inseparable from the economic progress which it is prevented from 
sabotaging by the forces inherent in its productive apparatus. What we have got to accept is 
that it has come to be the most powerful engine of that progress and in particular of the long-
run expansion of total output not only in spite of, but to a considerable extent through, this 
strategy which looks so restrictive when viewed in the individual case and from the individ-
ual point of time. In this respect, perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and 
has no title to being set up as a model of ideal efficiency.”); Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 
5, at 20 (“The persistent call for more attention to dynamic competition in antitrust analysis 
is . . . compelling . . . because we all know that static analysis has significant limitations[.]”); 
Sidak & Teece, supra note 5, at 600-02. 
 173. See Kobayashi et al., supra note 14, at 95 (arguing that taking account of innovation 
might transform reverse payment settlement analysis). 
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entirely by reference to a static model of consumer welfare that does 
not take gains from innovation into account.174  
 I show, however, that the conclusions that one might expect to fol-
low from taking innovation into account, namely, that reverse pay-
ment settlements and other settlements that delay generic entry ulti-
mately benefit consumers, do not follow.175 In the patent settlement 
context, antitrust’s role is to protect consumers from harm, relative to 
the welfare they would enjoy under litigation. Whether a rule that does 
no more than limit the size of a reverse payment meets this standard 
depends on the vagaries of the individual case. My estimates for the 
average drug suggest that even a ban on reverse payments allows con-
sumer harm, even after accounting for litigation.176 Of the rules that 
allow no harm, a settlement ban is least costly and therefore best. 
Even if the goal of antitrust in the patent settlement context were to 
promote maximization of consumer welfare through settlement, it does 
not follow that entry or reverse payment settlements are good for con-
sumers. Instead, the best rule is intervention by the FTC in settlement 
negotiations to protect the consumer interest, as this promises not 
merely to limit delay, as would alternatives, but to negotiate it to the 
welfare-maximizing level. 
                                                                                                                       
 174. Ginsburg and Wright argue that in general the absence of dynamic analysis in an-
titrust is due to a lack of economic tools. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 5, at 20-21 (“The 
call for a more dynamic approach is confounding because there is no learning presently avail-
able—nothing ready to wear, as it were—to give a greater temporal dimension to the analysis 
of a proposed merger or to the long-run effects of a business practice.”). 
 175. Cf. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 7, at 778 (arguing that some patent entry settlements 
“can be procompetitive because they can increase total consumer welfare in the long run”). 
 176. See Woodcock, Product Innovation, supra note 18, at 26-28 (providing estimates); 
cf. Sidak & Teece, supra note 5, at 586 (“[S]tatic analysis appears to dominate [in antitrust], 
even though thoughtful policymakers are aware of dynamic competition. Unfortunately, pol-
icymakers are left wielding static analysis in part because of an incorrect perception that 
scholars have not yet filled the intellectual void.”). 
